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HUMILIATION AND GREEK DEBT 
Dennis Smith* 
This article, the basis of a talk to the Hellenic Political Science Association in March 
2012, presents an approach to the analysis of humiliation or forced social displacement. It 
makes reference to the particular example of Greece during the sovereign debt crisis and 
offers a comparison with the effects of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans. Distinctions 
are made between yielding responses and challenging responses to humiliation, including 
escape and acceptance in the first category, and resistance-rejection, revenge-rejection and 
conciliation-reform in the latter category. 
I 
I am delighted to be in Athens talking to colleagues in the Hellenic Political 
Science Association.11 am bringing with me some ideas I have been developing 
over the past few years about the dynamics of humiliation, or forced social dis­
placement, and especially responses to the threat or experience of humiliation. 
As this is my first visit to Greece I do not, so far at least, have any direct expe­
rience of the "feel" and texture of everyday Greek politics and social life. In spite 
of this, I am being bold, or foolish, enough to talk to an audience that is thor­
oughly expert about the harsh and challenging situation that this article ex­
plores: not just experts in theory but also thoroughly involved in it every day. 
For me, coming to Athens to do this talk is a little like flying into Kathmandu 
to give a talk on Mount Everest to a gathering of Nepalese mountain guides.2 
* Dennis Smith is Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Loughborough University, UK. 
1. This text provided the basis for my presentation in Athens on 7th March 2012.1 am very 
grateful for the invitation to address the Association, and for the opportunity to talk informally 
about the issues with colleagues in Greece during my visit. I owe special thanks to Nicolas 
Demertzis, Michaels Spourdalakis, Costas Eleftheriou, Vasilis Rongas and Kanakis Leledakis. 
2. Looking back on my visit to Athens, five factors that I now think I underplayed in this 
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As everybody knows, the present time, early March 2012, is one of great 
uncertainty. The latest Greek loan has been agreed but nobody knows what 
will happen after the next parliamentary elections currently scheduled for 
April 2012. In spite of this uncertainty, it is worth trying to get a theoretical 
understanding of the dynamics of humiliation because this may provide some 
insights into the current situation as Greeks face up to demands for ever-in-
creasing austerity and self-sacrifice. 
I begin by noticing two things. One is that the current Greek crisis is a 
complex mixture shaped by factors such as: the geo-political constraints relat-
ing to Greece's location in South-Eastern Europe; the deep involvement of 
foreign governments in Greece's internal affairs; the strong hold of clientelism 
and patronage; hard bargaining over international loans and the handling of 
debt; and deep feelings of humiliation and resentment. The second thing I 
notice is that Greece has been in similar situations before in the course of its 
history where these factors have been present. For example, the Greek revolt 
against Ottoman rule in the 1820s was accompanied by an effective campaign 
by expatriates, migrants and foreign sympathizers in Europe and the 
American Republic who all emphasized the humiliation being undergone by 
the Greeks. Paintings by Delacroix, depicting Greeks as suffering victims, 
were one part of this. One outcome of this campaign was that loans were 
raised from the British government, and later from Britain (again) and, 
France and Russia. 
Now, these loans were not given out of pity for the Greeks, although obvi-
ously those feelings were very strong in many quarters. Foreign governments 
were willing to make these investments because of Greece's geo-political situa-
article are: the latent feeling among PASOK veterans that they were entitled to the rewards and 
good times they enjoyed in the 1980s and after as compensation for their suffering and 
exclusion in earlier decades; the embarrassment and even shame felt by many small private 
sector businesses at the publicity being given to their history of non-payment of taxes; the half-
open, half-hidden role of powerful business interests, which are not necessarily entirely sym-
pathetic in practice to the implementation of medium- and long-term strategies for strengthening 
the Greek political economy in the interests of the majority of citizens; the dense presence of 
Greek broadcast and print media which provide a very thick cloud cover over the political and 
economic landscape, able to skew and obfuscate debate, being by turns vitriolic and entertaining; 
and, not least the overwhelming national dominance of Athens, an urban zone containing a 
third of the Greek population, served by over twenty national newspapers, roughly the same 
number as the United Kingdom whose national population is over five times greater than that 
of Greece. 
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tion, being close to vital Mediterranean sea lanes and a good place to keep a 
close eye on the slowly crumbling Ottoman empire. There was, however, a 
political price to pay for those loans. Many leaders of the Greek uprising 
wanted a constitutional government without a monarch but they were forced 
to accept a German prince with a taste for absolutism as their ruler. The price 
of foreign loans was foreign interference. 
There is no need to present a long litany of historical evidence but it is 
worth recalling the work of the so-called International Financial Control that 
intervened directly in Greek government finances after Greece's disastrous 
war against Turkey in 1897. A few years earlier, the Greek government had 
declared itself bankrupt in 1893 and secured large loans in London, Paris, 
Berlin and Constantinople. These loans presumably helped pay for the war. 
The International Financial Control, run by Europe's big powers, set itself up 
in Athens in 1898. It took complete charge of collecting the sales taxes due 
on various government monopolies. The idea was to make sure the Greeks 
made repayments on foreign loans going as far back as 1833. The Inter-
national Foreign Control continued in existence until 1965. 
With that background in mind, let us turn to Syntagma Square in the cen-
tre of Athens in 2010 and 2011. Over the past few months Syntagma Square 
has been like a gigantic megaphone or loudspeaker. It has blared out a distress 
call, a prolonged and insistent distress call, fuelled by anger, fear and grievous 
suffering. How could it be otherwise when youth unemployment rises to n-
early fifty percent, when wages in the public sector are cut by over eighteen 
percent one year, and then again by eighteen percent in the following year, 
with more to come? Or when the minimum wage is to be cut by twenty-two 
percent? Or when taxes on ordinary citizens are increased while public expen-
diture on social services is radically reduced? Or when a large number of solid 
citizens with nice houses in the suburbs holding good middle level jobs in 
management and the professions suddenly find they are out of work and can-
not pay their mortgages? 
The main message being conveyed by men and women in the streets of 
Athens is intense indignation and outrage. It is clear that citizens feel they are 
being penalized for crimes they did not commit. Meanwhile, it seems to 
them that the perpetrators, the guilty ones, are escaping punishment and they 
are not changing their ways. Outside Greece, in Europe at large, as far as I can 
tell the dominant opinion in the streets is that the blame lies, quite simply, 
with "the Greeks." This verdict does not make any distinction between politi-
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cians and Greek citizens, which is, of course, unfair. The implication, howev-
er, is that "the Greeks" should, so to speak, "sort themselves out" and "put their 
affairs in order." 
By contrast, within Greece itself there seem to be many candidates for the 
title of "guilty ones" including international bankers, EU politicians and offi-
cials, Greek politicians, and "the Germans" with whom, of course, Greeks 
have had a rather unhappy relationship in the past, especially during World 
War II when Greece was under Nazi occupation between 1941 and 1944. 
On February 9th 2012 the populist newspaper Dimokratia printing on its 
front page a depiction of Angela Merkel in a Nazi uniform next to the head-
line "Memorandum Macht Frei". This puts together in one phrase Auschwitz 
and the Greek governments memorandum to the IMF on May 2010. This 
memorandum promised to achieve "higher and more equitable tax collec-
tions", and to "constrain... spending in the government wage bill and entitle-
ment outlays". By contrast, the next day, February 10th, we have the 
Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker declaring: "No disburse-
ment without implementation". This brings together in one phrase the IMF 
memorandum and the American War of Independence. Then on February 
11th we had George Karatzaferis, the extreme right-wing leader of LAOS, (the 
Popular Orthodox Rally) resigning from the Papademos coalition govern-
ment along with several other colleagues. Karatzaferis reportedly said: "What 
has particularly bothered me is the humiliation of the country". He added 
that he could do without "the German boot".3 
This present article does not and could not try to unravel the Greek crisis 
or predict its eventual outcome. However, it will hopefully help us make sense 
of the crisis if we try to understand more about the nature, causes and conse-
quence of humiliation, a process that has a variety of expressions and many d-
ifferent effects. That is what the next part of the article is about. Then in the 
final part of the article I will briefly explore some implications of the general 
analysis for the particular case of Greece and the EU. 
3. As reported in The Guardian, 10 February 2012. We can add to this volatile mixture fac-
tors such as the frequent anti-German comments of television presenter Georgios Trangas, the 
cartoons of Stathis Stavropoulos, depicting contemporary German leaders in military uniforms 
from the 1940s, and the burning of a German flag by demonstrators. 
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Π 
I am mainly going to be talking about how people respond when they have 
suffered humiliation but first I will say something briefly about humiliation 
from the point of those who deliberately impose it on others.4 For people 
who impose humiliation on others, one reward is the pleasure of demonstrat­
ing their strength. That includes both the capacity to prevent other people 
from harming you and the capacity to damage or destroy other people if you 
choose to do so. Humiliation is at the very heart of the very ancient (but still 
very much alive) honour code, which says that the only thing that truly com­
mands and deserves respect is strength: both creative and destructive. I should 
add immediately that imposing humiliation on others may also lead to, or be 
accompanied by, various other rewards for the perpetrators such as a reduc­
tion of the victims' resistance to their own plans for socio-political change. 
Humiliation, has three "moments", to borrow, and adapt, a Hegelian term. 
These moments may appear separately, in sequence, or all together. In Syn­
tagma Square they have appeared all together, seen from the perspective of 
the victims. First, there is the moment or phase of defeat and subjection to 
conquest. This happens when people that have tasted liberty, the capacity for 
autonomous action in pursuit of their own freely chosen goals, discover that 
their hands are tied. They have overwhelmed and put under restraint: they have 
been fitted with a straitjacket and had their wrists clamped inside handcuffs. 
For example, as is well known, Brussels virtually imposed a new govern­
ment on Greece led by Lucas Papademos, a former Governor of the Bank of 
Greece. Also, the German government proposed that an EU budget commis­
sioner should be appointed to take control of Greece's tax and spending, pre­
sumably to make sure that Greece behaves "properly" in return for being giv­
en further loans to deal with its large public debt. 
Then comes the moment of relegation or being pushed down the order of 
power and status. The promise of Europe -the "European Dream" so to s-
peak- is that when a people join the European Union they are entering a 
promised land of equality amongst European nations. Joining the EU is antic­
ipated as a process of emancipation and enhanced national status and recogni­
tion. But in the past few years, for Greece this has turned out to be a mon­
strous fantasy, a chimera. It seems that when the chips are down, or when the 
4.1 should say that not all humiliation is deliberate. Sometimes it can happen by accident. 
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chips run out, control lies with the North of Europe: Brussels, Berlin and 
Paris. At that point it turns out that certain Southern members of the EU, 
such as Greece and Portugal, are near the bottom of the European political 
league table. 
The third moment is exclusion. People have arrived at this point when 
they notice that even when they (Greece) are the main topic of debate they 
(the Greeks) cannot be heard within that debate. No one is listening to ordi-
nary Greek people, it seems. Their own plans and proposals are ignored and 
their own hopes for the future are discounted and written off. This sense of 
exclusion is intensified when the "normal" transmission belts for exercising in-
fluence in a capitalist democracy turn out to be much less effective than be-
fore. The power to spend or not to spend is weakened when the peoples 
spending power is gone. The power to vote for this or that party is a puny 
one when most people distrust almost all those politicians. The power of 
strike action is reduced when a substantial part of the trade union leadership 
seems to be committed to imposing austerity rather than modifying it sub-
stantially. And the power to demonstrate peacefully is ineffective when the 
government has made itself deaf to the noise outside. 
To summarize, humiliation as conquest, relegation and exclusion adds up 
to a forcibly imposed loss or radical reduction in freedom, recognition, a-
gency and security. To put it another way, it is a forced social displacement 
that is experienced as degrading. 
People "feel humiliated" when they are pushed about, pushed down, or 
pushed out in an offensive way, not necessarily physically, but psychologically 
and socially. At the heart of humiliation, for those at the receiving end, is the 
experience of involuntary displacement from their established and familiar so-
cial position and social identity. 
These feelings are experienced by individuals but often in a collective con-
text, for example in a crowd, or as part of the crew in a battleship, or as the 
member of a government ministry, or as a work-force. The responses of those 
who have been humiliated may also be collective, like a riot or a strike, and 
may have large effects such as the breakdown of socio-political order, the out-
break of war, or revolutionary uprisings. 
Being humiliated produces intense discomfort in the person or group at 
the receiving end. It means being forced to acquiesce in something that seems 
totally unacceptable by those subjected to it. The immediate source of dis-
comfort is the unpleasant difference between two things: on the one hand, 
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the sufferers' own sense of who they are and where they fit into the world; 
and, on the other hand, the demeaning identity and unworthy social position 
that the act of humiliation imposes upon them. 
The discomfort is compounded by realisation that the forced social dis-
placement has brought about an unwelcome reframing not only of the suffer-
ers' location in social space but also their location in social time. In other 
words, their perception of their own past, present and future is transformed. 
The past seems brighter than before, the future worse than they previously ex-
pected, the present less bearable than it used to be. 
Humiliation is dislocating, and dislocation always causes intense discom-
fort, whether it is dislocation of a shoulder or dislocation of a social identity 
and a planned career. Humiliation therefore requires action to relieve that dis-
comfort. Reflection is one form of action, and may indeed be the only one 
available in certain circumstances, for example during a prison sentence.5 
However, other forms of action may also be possible. These are typically di-
rected at bringing about transformations by, for example, strengthening the 
threatened self, strengthening the threatened group, reducing the extent to 
which the self or the group are in vulnerable situations, reducing the extent to 
which the humiliating agent is able to be effective, or reducing the extent to 
which the socio-political structure creates humiliating situations. 
These possibilities may be simplified into the statement that there are three 
directions in which action may be possible: towards the "inner", the "outer" 
and the "other" (see appendix A, figure 1 ). 
By action towards the inner, I mean action intended to preserve or (more 
likely) reshape the inner constitution and dynamics of the person or group, 
including their assumptions, habits and capacities. By action towards the out-
er, I mean action intended to preserve or (more likely) reshape the social 
and/or political structure and/or pattern of external relations in which the 
person or group is embedded. By action towards the other, I mean action in-
tended to preserve or (more likely) reshape relations with the threatening ri-
val, enemy or oppressor that is the direct agent of humiliation. I shall try to 
illustrate these forms of action in the case of specific types of response to the 
threat or fact of humiliation. 
I want to divide the potential reactions of those who experience humilia-
5.1 have written a paper on the prison experiences of radical writers and political leaders, 
which will be appearing in a book entitled Emotions in Politics edited by Nicolas Demertzis to 
be published by Macmillan. 
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tion into two kinds of movement: backward away from the threat, and for-
ward to meet the threat; in other words, yielding responses and challenging 
responses (see appendix A, figure 2). I am going to begin by discussing two 
yielding responses: acceptance and escape. 
Acceptance of humiliation is more than mere passive acquiescence. 
Acceptance means redefining the forced social displacement as appropriate 
and deserved. This means signalling agreement with the norms, values and 
judgements expressed in the humiliating action that has hurt them. Once 
those at the receiving end agree that they have been justly punished for their 
own faults, the way is open for their initial feelings of anger and fear to be re-
placed by feelings of shame caused by awareness of their own wrongful ac-
tions or attitudes in the recent past. 
Newly awakened, so to speak, the accepters come round to agreeing with 
their "oppressors" that the new social position and social identity assigned to 
them against their will are, in fact, appropriate. They realise that they should, 
in fact, bow down before the judgement that has relocated them in this way. 
Perhaps a good example of this would be the conversion of governments that 
initially opposed the so-called Washington Consensus, with its emphasis on 
privatization and business-friendly tax regimes, following "persuasive" visits by 
representatives of the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. 
However, acceptance may be outward only, and hedged about with inter-
nal reservations. If so, it may, or may not, become more "genuine" with time. 
In any case, the success of an acceptance strategy depends on two things (see 
appendix A, figure 3). One is the level of trust that can be built and sustained 
between the parties concerned. The other condition is whether the more 
powerful partner, the one responsible for the initial process of humiliation, 
can exhibit sufficient reciprocity to persuade the repentant victim that they 
can be re-integrated into the relationship in a way that is satisfying for all. But 
these two things may fail to occur. This seems very relevant to the current 
Greek situation since one of the things that make the current situation seem 
so unfair from the Greek citizens' point of view is that the austerity being de-
manded of them does not seem to be matched by practical help of some kind 
from the EU to enable Greece rebuild its economy and strengthen its political 
institutions. 
The danger for the willing victim is that those who control their fate may 
regard them as intrinsically unworthy, irrespective of how they are behaving. 
If this is the case, they may become vulnerable to a cycle of victimization in-
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volving further acts of humiliation. It seems clear that repeated victimization 
is the fear, indeed the experience, of those who protest in Syntagma Square. It 
can be suggested that prolonged victimization sometimes lead to a revenge re-
sponse by the victims, all the more effective for being unexpected. 
Accepters reform themselves without relocating themselves. They stay and 
face the music. They re-make themselves in the image required by those who 
have power over them. By contrast, escapees -to whom we now turn- relo-
cate themselves without reforming themselves. They go away so they can 
make their own music elsewhere. They re-make their new society, home or 
"promised land" in their own image. 
In contrast with acceptance, which seeks to remove the victim's objection 
to the humiliation itself, escape is a strategy of physically moving the intended 
object of humiliation away from potential harm. The object of escape is to 
find a well-defended place where the escapees can "be themselves", untrou-
bled by "others". A classic case is Americas "Pilgrim Fathers" who sailed from 
Plymouth in the early seventeenth century to "the new world" in order to es-
cape religious persecution. Unlike accepters, escapees do not give up the proj-
ect of building a better society or a better home in which they can live more 
happily without humiliation. However, they decide to pursue the project 
somewhere else, far away, where nobody can stop them. They endeavour to 
make a society that conforms to how they are: for example, in the new 
American Republic, or South Africa, or Israel, for example. 
Escapees, and the descendants of escapees, in America and elsewhere, are 
likely to feel wounded and distrustful, inclined to expect the worst from their 
neighbours. A key factor is whether or not escapees can restrain their fear of 
others; a difficult proposition especially since "others" that are unknown and 
different almost always do, in fact, exist. If such "others" are held to be a po-
tential threat the dangerous possibility exists that this attitude may lead to re-
peated "pre-emptive strikes" against any unfamiliar strangers who stray into 
their vicinity; in other words, it may lead to a fear cycle. These aggressive ac-
tions are likely to cause deep resentment among the victims thus creating the 
very enemies that were feared. These new enemies may seek reprisals. In this 
way, fear cycles, the repeated striking out against real or imagined dangers, 
may be rapidly converted into a series of revenge cycles as hurt victims strike 
back in anger. 
There is a final set of differences between escapees and accepters: when 
faced with "others" that are potentially threatening, the accepters try hard to 
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bring about a positive engagement with them but the escapees are much less 
inclined to do this. This means that accepters, unlike escapees, acquire valu-
able experience of a kind that may empower them in a wide range of future 
situations. The point is that their attempts to engage in positive engagement 
with the oppressive or aggressive "other" give accepters practical knowledge 
about where the other s strengths and weaknesses are, and about what works 
or does not work in dealing with them. 
Furthermore, if accepters are acting out a part, presenting the "required" 
face to the "master", they develop their skills of deception. In effect, they 
learn to cultivate both an inner self and an outer self and use one to control 
the other. These skills can all be useful in a wide range of situations. Finally, 
accepters develop the capacity to self-transform. They learn how to work on 
their own individual self or the groups sense of identity so as to mould it to 
the needs of the situation. The point is that those who have remade them-
selves by becoming accepters know the relevant techniques and in many cases 
can do it again, changing themselves in another direction, if and when it be-
comes necessary. 
Turning to challenging response to humiliation, we can distinguish be-
tween rejection, which directs its attention to the effects of humiliation, and 
another approach, here labelled conciliation-reform, which works to decom-
mission the causes of humiliation by combining conciliation through truce 
and dialogue with reforming initiatives in relation to the "inner", the "outer" 
and the "other". 
Rejection, like acceptance, requires the ability to self-transform, to work 
upon the "inner". For example, it is significant that the clearest message con-
veyed by Nelson Mandela to his followers in the Black townships when he 
was finally released from jail was: educate yourselves, go back to school. 
Individual and collective self-strengthening were vital. That was Mandela's 
preferred route for raising the condition of Black South Africans. 
Education would ensure that Black South Africans could take their proper 
place as fully emancipated members of post-apartheid society. That meant re-
straining the anger that led to reprisal attacks on Black policemen. These were 
people who had been enforcing law and order on behalf of the apartheid 
regime and were therefore enemies, as their attackers saw it. This issue exposes 
a fundamental division between two strategies within the rejection approach. 
We can label these resistance-rejection and revenge-rejection. 
Resistan ce-rejection seeks to do three related things: to undermine the op-
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pressor or enemy; to protect the individual or group under threat; and to 
build up the capacity and resources of the threatened individual or group, not 
only for defence but also -and this is very important- for development in a 
direction that allows them to fulfil themselves. 
In the case of Mandela and his co-workers, that meant teaching the rank 
and file of the African National Congress (ANC) how to be restrained and 
how to build up their own skills and reliability. It meant training the leader-
ship of the ANC how to rule, how to have the confidence and strategic intelli-
gence they would need when they eventually got into government. It also 
meant undermining the humiliating agent by protecting the targets of abuse 
from degradation and building up their strength. That was the ambition that 
lay behind the carefully calculated campaign of insurgency carried out by the 
African National Congress (ANC). The object was to undermine apartheid, 
but definitely not to massacre Whites or kill Black Africans who were part of 
the regimes bureaucracy. 
Nelson Mandela, for one, realised that at some point there would have to 
be positive (ie peaceful) engagement with the apartheid regime itself, speaking 
to those who had traditionally opposed socio-political change. When that 
happened, the ANC would be able to build on the ground won through their 
strategy of resistance-rejection. As things turned out, in the end the White 
minority regime was eventually prepared to negotiate change. That made pos-
sible a shift by the ANC away from a sole reliance on the resistance-rejection 
strategy, which was fundamentally negative, expressing a determined refusal to 
acquiesce in oppression. The ANC moved to a twin-track approach, which 
ran the resistance-rejection strategy alongside a strategy of conciliation-re-
form, leading in this case to the abolition of apartheid. 
However, as we have seen, there is another rejection strategy and that is re-
venge-rejection, the approach followed by those who seek the satisfaction of 
revenge, perhaps because no other approach seems possible. So, what does re-
venge involve? It means the recovery of honour and self-regard by striking 
back against a target closely associated with a hated oppressor or enemy, caus-
ing as much damage as possible. 
The revenge-rejection strategy bypasses and pushes aside any consideration 
of structural reforms aimed at removing the causes of socio-political degrada-
tion. It does not take that route. Instead it seeks to inflict damage and impose 
a counter-humiliation. It strikes out at any vulnerable aspect or symbol of the 
hated enemy upon whom revenge is being enacted. A successful revenge at-
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tack gives an immediate boost to those who are disheartened or disgusted by-
being humiliated. This is because it turns the tables, for a while at least, on 
whoever or whatever is causing their own humiliation. 
However, revenge may also have disadvantageous effects for those who in-
flict it. If you burn down your local budget-price supermarket, where do you 
shop next week? If you take part in a prison riot, where do you get breakfast 
while it is going on? Even more important, revenge does not normally come 
in single acts followed by a full stop. Instead, it almost always invites, even de-
mands, an answer on the part of the recipient. It is part of a nasty and often 
violent "conversation" that may be difficult to end except through mutual ex-
haustion or the utter defeat of one side or the other. 
Despite these disadvantages, revenge cycles occupy a key position in the 
"machinery" of humiliation, as we have seen. When anger dominates rejec-
tion responses, the outcome is often a strategy of revenge-rejection leading to 
revenge cycles. When the escape response fails to master and minimise fear, 
this leads to distrust of strangers and of independent-minded neighbours, re-
sulting sometimes in fear cycles, which may, once again, trigger revenge cy-
cles. When the acceptance response does not engender trust and reciprocity, 
repeated victimization may occur leading to distrust, then anger, then a resort 
to revenge. As we will see, even the conciliation-reform approach is vulnera-
ble to the onset of distrust and the resurgence of revenge-cycles 
In fact, revenge and revenge cycles are like a huge conduit or channel re-
ceiving from above all the gravity feeds just mentioned. Revenge welcomes 
into its huge mouth all those who initially pursue escape, acceptance and re-
sistance-rejection strategies, but encounter failure, and find themselves strik-
ing back at old or new enemies. Revenge is the default mode of responding to 
humiliation, when all else has failed. For anyone who cares about human 
rights this is a very unfortunate situation. 
The situation is unfortunate because revenge is a concept drawn from the 
heart of the honour code (see appendix A, figure 4). This code is a way of 
judging behaviour that greatly values the very ability to impose humiliation on 
others. The capacity to strike down those who displease you has been for cen-
turies accepted as something glorious. It is central to the existence of the feu-
dal lord, the traditional aristocrat, the warring tribe, some football fans, some 
newspaper editors, some politicians and, indeed, the state, both yesterday and 
today, especially its military wing, and especially at times of confrontation 
with its external enemies. Some aspects of the honour code can also be dis-
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cerned, perhaps, in the neo-liberal approach to the market, which relishes e-
conomic struggle, glorifies "winners" and shows contempt for "losers". 
Adherents of the honour code bow down low before those who have suffi-
cient resources and organisational capacity to strike down and destroy others 
or to nurture and protect them, depending on which they choose to do. That 
is obviously the opposite stance to the one taken by the human rights code, 
which "outlaws" humiliation to the best of its ability. The human rights code 
is a relative newcomer to human history. There were, of course, very impor-
tant glimmers of it in ancient Greece and the religions of Abraham. However, 
these ideas acquired enormous world-wide prestige following the success of 
the independence struggle in the American Republic and the abolition of the 
French monarchy and aristocracy during the French Revolution. 
In sharp contrast to the honour code, the human rights code respects the 
principle that all human beings have a legitimate expectation to be treated hu-
manely. In other words, they should not be penalised or disadvantaged on the 
grounds of gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or because they are physically 
or mentally challenged in some way. Furthermore, all human beings have a 
right to the means of living a healthy, secure and fulfilling life. 
As is well know, Alexis de Tocqueville predicted in Democracy in America 
that the honour code, the code of Tocqueville s own social class, the aristocra-
cy, would disappear with the rise of democracy and the human rights code. In 
fact, today the two codes coexist in all modern societies. Meanwhile, the 
built-in drift towards revenge-rejection when other strategies fail favours the 
honour code. This makes it possible that the changes in law and behaviour 
made in support of the human rights code over the past two centuries might 
be reversed. 
To put it another way, if fear and anger repeatedly get out of control, if 
trust and reciprocity fall into decay or are not carefully cultivated and rebuilt, 
then all responses to humiliation will lead in the end towards the politics of 
resentment and revenge and the squeeze on human rights will intensify. The 
honour code will rule. Strength and weakness will be the only language. 
If this analysis is correct, the drift towards revenge-rejection as a response 
to humiliation has been repeatedly occurring for centuries, maybe millennia. 
So what is new? The point is that the human rights that have been secured by 
trade unions, campaigning professional groups, and movements for democra-
cy over the past two centuries have been "stored" or "banked" in national citi-
zenship rights and national legal systems. That is, of course, how they get in-
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stitutional embodiment and become available for future use. So those that 
value human rights have a substantial asset banked in various national states. 
However, during and since the 1990s and 2000s, more aspects of our lives 
are controlled and influenced by market and cultural forces that are beyond 
the control of national states. This means that national states are becoming 
relatively weaker and less able to enforce their will, and this weakens the insti-
tutional defences of the human rights code. While humiliation cycles persist, 
the secular drift towards revenge is likely to shift the balance of advantage 
away from human rights towards the honour code, perhaps decisively. 
Seen from this perspective, added importance is acquired by the strategy 
of conciliation-reform, which seeks not just to undermine the effects of hu-
miliation but also to remove the structural sources of humiliation. 
Observation suggests that conciliation-reform is most likely to be attempted 
after a revenge cycle has been underway for some time between two states, 
groups or individuals and each is accusing the other of aggressive behaviour 
that inflicts unjustified and despicable humiliations upon them. 
If the costs of conflict escalate and become debilitating and exhausting, a 
cessation of violence may sometimes become possible. This may give the op-
portunity for conciliation to take place. In other words, the people involved 
look for a way to manage their differences peacefully and through dialogue, 
and try to build a stable relationship in which they can each achieve their 
goals and can also achieve some shared goals. Where conciliation is attempt-
ed, the idea is that dialogue may lead towards increasing trust, the gradual e-
mancipation of all parties from the old hatreds, and reform of the humiliat-
ing structures and processes. 
But truce talks may be hindered by resurgences of distrust. The truce may be 
simply used as a way for opposed and contesting parties to get their breath back 
before they move back into more open and less restrained struggle. If that pat-
tern prevails then the result is a distrust cycle: exhaustion, truce, dialogue, dis-
trust, return to conflict and the revenge cycle, more exhaustion, another truce, 
another attempt at dialogue, renewed distrust, and eventually a withdrawal 
from conciliation. The default position is, once again, the revenge cycle. 
For an emancipation process to succeed, the parties involved in the attempts 
at conciliation need to be prepared to engage constructively with each other, 
be ready to undergo self-transformation, and be committed to undertaking 
reform of the structures and processes in which they are mutually involved. 
At this point it would be worth having another look at the analysis we did 
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earlier. I argued that the experience of humiliation was likely to strengthen the 
disposition of some individuals and groups to try and transform three aspects 
of their situation: the "inner" self, the "outer" socio-political context in which 
they were embedded, and their relations with the "other": the enemy, rival or 
oppressor responsible for their humiliation. Perhaps at this point we can draw 
some preliminary conclusions about how the different kinds of response to 
humiliation are likely to shape the dispositions in these three respects of the 
people involved (see appendix A, figure 5). 
Escapees and revenge-resisters are the most "conservative". They need to 
have courage to take the risks of encountering the unknown. They also have 
to toughen themselves up to withstand the rigours of travel and battle. 
However, those factors do not, in themselves, make them flexible and open-
minded. Escapees are in search of somewhere that "suits them better". This 
means they have only a very weak disposition to change themselves or the 
"old" social environment that is the source of their initial humiliation; and 
they have no interest in dealing further with their old oppressors. So they s-
core low on all three counts, relating to the inner, the outer and the other. 
The same is true of revenge-resisters who are above all keen to "score for their 
team", not to undertake positive engagement with the other or undertake ma-
jor structural reform. 
Compare those who seek conciliation-reform. They have positive orienta-
tions towards transforming the inner, the outer, and relations with the other. 
In many circumstances, conciliation-reformers will be in a minority but this 
analysis suggests they may find allies. For example, resistance-rejecters have 
strong dispositions towards self-transformation and structural reform. For 
their part, acceptors are experienced in self-transformation and positive en-
gagement with the other. This suggests that those who seek conciliation and 
reform through truce and dialogue may find allies amongst disillusioned ac-
cepters, and resilient resistance-rejecters. Such an alliance may have the best 
chance if revenge-resisters are exhausted, especially if some of them have 
strong sympathies with resistance-rejecters. 
m 
Finally, let us return to our starting point, the current crisis with particular 
reference to Greece. The level of public debt in Greece became an issue when 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 06:22:19 |
142 DENNIS SMITH 
the credit crunch, which had originated across the Atlantic, struck Europe. In 
some key respects, the impact of the credit crunch was rather like the arrival 
of Hurricane Katrina on the southern seaboard of the United States. Katrina 
tested the fortifications that had been built against the raging sea. In New 
Orleans, which was largely built below sea level, the levee failed and the 
floodwaters rushed in, devastating the city. 
There followed a huge row about whose fault it was that the fortifications 
had not been built more strongly, with both the local administration and the 
federal government trying to avoid the blame. To summarise a complex situa-
tion in a few words, Washington was very slow in coming to the rescue of the 
citizens of New Orleans and the people in that city felt that they were being 
regarded "from above" as useless, not worth taking any trouble over. 
The city of New Orleans is, of course, a very different case from the na-
tion of Greece in several important ways. However, the comment on aban-
donment signals a point of contact between the two cases. Underlying the 
anger and distress in Athens there is, surely, the very deep shock of discover-
ing that that the leaders of the EU are abandoning the Greeks to their fate. 
The shock stems from the fact that Greeks entered the EU in 1981 with 
great enthusiasm having struggled out of the grip of military dictatorship only 
a few years before. In a thoroughly positive and proud spirit they embraced its 
democratic ideals and its commitment to the human rights code. When the 
credit crunch arrived, this commitment failed at crucial points. As in New 
Orleans, there is some feeling in Greece, rightly or wrongly, that the treat-
ment of the Greeks goes beyond mere neglect and involves deliberate brutali-
sation and victimization. In Athens, at least, this is partially counter-balanced 
by an acceptance response, justifiable or not, that perceives the situation the 
Greeks find themselves as being "our own fault", the result of unwise actions 
by both politicians and private citizens. This "acceptance" response is, of 
course, quite compatible with a feeling of being victimized, a feeling that 
stems from a lack of trust and reciprocity on both sides. 
The main result of this lack of trust and reciprocity has been that the EU 
has not had the political will to exercise one aspect of the human rights code, 
which is the duty of care towards all citizens. This is the idea that the relevant 
community through its governmental agencies accepts responsibility to see 
that standards of civilized living are maintained for all citizens, who have a 
right to recognition, security, freedom and agency. 
This is relevant because there have been two huge "selling points" that 
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made the European Union attractive to ordinary citizens over recent decades. 
One has been that, to a greater extent than the United States, the EU has 
strongly promoted legislation and public funding to support social rights such 
as a minimum wage, decent healthcare and so on. The other attractive feature 
has been that, again unlike the American government, the European Union 
has not been completely dominated by large business interests. Most EU 
funding ultimately flows from taxes paid by voters in member states, so their 
demand for social rights carries weight in the European Commission. 
However, the EU s recent behaviour towards Greece seems to contradict 
both of these features of past EU practice. On the one hand, the austerity 
measures seem to take no account of the intense and prolonged human suf-
fering they are causing by preventing Greeks from obtaining many of the so-
cial rights they are used to having; in effect, taking those away. On the other 
hand, the loans being given to the Greek government are not intended to de-
velop Greece's infrastructure, invest in Greek enterprises, encourage growth 
or create jobs. Instead, they will be used to repay debts to European bankers. 
So the EU is apparently putting the interests of corporate big business above 
those of ordinary people. That is certainly how it looks on the streets. 
How does this express itself in terms of the dynamics of humiliation or 
forced social displacement? For a start, it is noticeable that coverage of the 
crisis in the Greek media is pushing together two things. One is the fact that 
ordinary citizens are not being treated in a decent way, and are having to bear 
inhuman conditions: meaning loss of jobs, cuts in pensions, reduction of 
wages, increases in taxes, and so on. The other theme is that the damage and 
hurt the Greeks are experiencing is being caused by Germans and this fact is 
offensive to Greece's national honour. 
To coin a phrase, this adds insult to injury; more precisely, it adds national 
insult to personal injury. It brings into play the honour code, which values 
strength, and is sometimes prepared to consider violence. It is not surprising 
to see stereotypes being projected in the other direction also, from Brussels 
and Berlin against the Greeks, and equally unfairly. Again the American paral-
lel is suggestive. The citizens of New Orleans were told by their "betters" in 
Washington and elsewhere that their bad circumstances were largely due to 
the workings of an impersonal force, the weather, which no one can control, 
and that they, the local people, were to blame for the disaster because they 
should have exercised more foresight and built better defences against possible 
hurricanes. 
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The defence to this charge is that, as is normal, the people of New Orleans 
left that task to their political leaders, both locally in city and centrally in 
Washington. And they were let down by both sets of leaders. Compare 
Athens. The situation can be described in almost the same words. 
Superior-sounding outsiders have been telling Greeks that their bad cir-
cumstances are largely due to the workings of an impersonal force, the mar-
ket, which no one can control, and that they only have themselves to blame 
for the disaster because they should have exercised more foresight and built 
better defences against possible economic hurricanes. In fact, as is normal, the 
people of Greece left that task to their political leaders, both the government 
in Athens and the EU in Brussels. And they were let down by both sets of 
leaders. As in America, so in Europe: both the local and the central leadership 
failed to carry through the necessary task because of the short-term costs in-
volved. Hence the unmanageable debts and the bitter austerity packages. 
Hence the angry demonstrations. 
However, there is one thing left out of that analysis: in New Orleans and 
the state of Louisiana there is a long history of clientelism, corruption and pa-
tronage; it has been reported that there are also some elements of this in 
Greece. Have citizens in either Greece or Louisiana given sufficient support to 
movements that could have changed this and made them less vulnerable to 
challenges such as the hurricane and the credit crunch? 
However, a more immediate question is how have Greeks responded to 
these recent humiliations? Contrast once more the case of New Orleans, 
where a very widespread citizens' response to their situation was a "yielding" 
response: escape to other cities. This was dictated by opportunity and by ne-
cessity. By opportunity because distances were short, language was not a prob-
lem, transport was available and relatives were willing. By necessity because so 
much of the city's housing had been destroyed. 
In the case of Greece, escape is not so high on the agenda, although it may 
become so for many young people if they choose to emigrate. In Athens, un-
like New Orleans, people still have a city in which they can demonstrate. 
Greek citizens who are unable or unwilling to either escape or accept the hu-
miliation being imposed upon them, are turning instead towards challenge re-
sponses. Resistance-rejection would mean finding ways to strengthen Greece's 
capacity to withstand financial and political pressure. That depends upon 
finding the means to build a stronger economy and put in place a govern-
ment that has strong public backing. At the moment that seems very difficult 
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to achieve, although it must be assumed that many people are working on it. 
Meanwhile, a strong current of revenge-rejection seems to be building. For 
example, insults are being poured on Brussels and Berlin in the media and on 
the streets. Any Greek politician who has been involved in supporting the aus-
terity packages is also likely to be "slaughtered" at the polls, to use the lan-
guage of the honour code, whenever the next election is held. Looking fur-
ther ahead, it would not be surprising to see a degree of increased political in-
stability in Greece, for a while at least, especially while half of Greece's young 
people are without a job. 
At the moment, the Greek state probably has at least two cards in its hand. 
One is anxiety within the EU that if Greece leaves the Euro it will weaken the 
credibility and prestige of the currency with bad effects across the EU. The 
second is that political instability within Greece might have damaging conse-
quences for the stability of South-Eastern Europe as a whole. However, those 
two cards may not be as strong as they seem. It is not clear that the EU politi-
cians and officials will have the political ability over the next few years to avert 
those dangers by keeping Greece within the Euro and inside the EU. 
We should consider that some quite well-organized interests might quite 
like to see the disruption that a Greek exit from the Euro and the EU would 
cause. I am referring to speculators: financial speculators and political specula-
tors. Financial speculators are able to make profits from sudden and extreme 
movements in currencies, bonds, shares and so on, whether these movements 
are up or down. The break up of the Euro would be a great money-making 
opportunity, especially for those who can shift their assets across the world, 
taking their winnings away from the scene of destruction. 
Political speculators live off the passions generated by humiliation, using 
them as a source of energy. Such speculators might be able to use that political 
energy to try and weaken institutions and structures they dislike, and then 
create power bases for themselves. This is not intrinsically either good or bad: 
after all, one such speculator was Mahatma Gandhi. However, my point here 
is that this possibility must be factored in. 
The next election, whenever it goes ahead, is expected to transform the 
landscape of political parties: how much is a matter of debate. Obviously this 
will put many existing understandings and expectations in doubt, especially in 
the public sector. That makes it a moment both of danger and of opportuni-
ty. As power balances change and resources become very scarce there may be 
talk of "settling old scores" within Greek society and politics. When the poli-
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tics of giving rewards becomes difficult, the politics of inflicting punishments 
raises its head. However, it is perhaps also an opportunity to pool the society's 
resources and rebuild the Greek political economy. 
I will risk one observation. This is that nothing can be done unless the 
main actors involved recognise that beside the historical track along which 
they are travelling stands a huge lever. To use an image from old technology, 
and old silent films, this lever is like those devices that shift railways lines 
from one direction to another by moving the points. The question is: which 
line do the citizens of Greece want to go down as they respond to the intense 
humiliation they are now experiencing? Do they want to go down the track of 
repeated cycles of revenge? How many people would wish that future on their 
grandchildren? Or do they want to go down the track of conciliation-reform, 
involving the pursuit of structural change and positive engagement with the 
other, or indeed various others? Such a future seems more promising. 
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APPENDIX A 
FIGURE 1 
Key Dispositions tested by Humiliation 
Disposition of the 
humiliated person 
or group - ^ -
Towards the 
"outer" 
Towards 
the "inner" 
Towards 
the "other" 
FIGURE 2 
Four Possible Responses to Humiliation 
Yielding 
Responses 
Challenging 
Responses 
ESCAPE 
ACCEPTANCE 
REJECTION 
CONCILIATION-
REFORM 
tries to remove the potential 
object of hum iliation 
tries to remove the objection 
to humiliation 
tries to eliminate the 
effects of humiliation 
tries to eliminate the 
causes of humiliation 
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FIGURE 3 
Requirements of Success and Costs of Failure 
Yielding 
Responses 
Challenging 
Responses 
ESCAPE 
ACCEPTANCE 
REJECTION 
CONCILIATION-
REFORM 
Success requires 
control of fear 
Success requires 
trust and reciprocity 
Success requires 
control of anger 
Success requires con-
trol and reciprocity 
Failure may lead to 
Fear Cycle 
Failure may lead to 
Victimization Cycle 
Failure may lead to 
Revenge Cycle 
Failure may lead to 
Distrust Cycle 
FIGURE 4 
Honour Code and Human Rights Code 
The HONOUR CODE recognizes as 
"honourable" an actor's 
STRENGTH. In other words their... 
(i) capacity to enter, survive, and achieve 
success in the social struggle, even at the 
cost of damaging or destroying rivals 
(ii) capacity to provide or withhold care 
and protection for others, or damage or 
destroy others at will, and 
(iii) capacity to provide or withhold life-
enhancing benefits 
The HUMAN RIGHTS CODE recog-
nizes that all actors have RIGHTS, 
including... 
(i) the right to enter, and be fairly treated 
in, the social competition (eg. for jobs 
and income) 
(ii) rights with respect to the provision 
of care and protection 
(iii) rights with respect to life-enhancing 
benefits 
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FIGURE 5 
Potential Allies for Conciliation-Reform 
Conciliation-Reformers 
Resistance-Rejecters 
Accepters 
Revenge-Resisters 
Escapees 
Disposition towards: 
Transformation 
of The Inner 
Transformation 
Strong 
Strong 
Strong 
Weak 
Weak 
Transformation 
of The Outer 
Transformation 
Strong 
Strong 
Weak 
Weak 
Weak 
Positive Engagement 
with The Other 
Positive Engagement 
Strong 
Weak 
Strong 
Weak 
Weak 
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